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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, d/b/a
LDS HOSPITAL,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

14690

-vsINDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and MARY JEAN ORTEGA,
Defendants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

COMES NOW the defendant Industrial Commission of Utah, and
respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in
the above-entitled case.
This Petition is based on the following grounds.
POINT I.
THIS COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE
COMMISSION MADE A FINDING WHICH IN FACT
THE COMMISSION DID NOT MAKE.
This Court, as part of its decision of March 25, 1977,
stated:
The major difficulty in this case stems
from the fact that the Commission found that
the claimant had a pre-existing psychological
condition relating to pain in her back, which
combined with this accident resulted in permanent partial disability of . 30 percent, 10
percent attributable to the pre-existing

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
i may contain errors.

condition and the other 20 percent to this
accident. The claimant's testimony and the
medical report provide support for that
finding; and, since the latter also indicates
that continued psychiatric treatment may lead
to further significant improvement in the
claimant's condition, the Commission reserved
its final determination of the plaintiff's
liability for total disability benefits until
the treatment is completed. (emphasis added).
The Commission made no such finding.
and individual doctors and attorneys

The medical panel

for the parties talked

of such percentages but the 3cecord clearly shows that the
findings and Order of the Commission reserved, pending the
outcome of the psychiatric treatment and further psychiatric
evaluation, the issues pertaining to permanent partial disability compensation.

(R-97).

This Court correctly acknowledged in the above quoted
paragraph that the Commission reserved its final determination
until the treatment is completed but incorrectly stated "the
Commission reserved its final determination of the plaintiff's
liability for total disability benefits" when it should have
read "permanent partial disability benefits."

There is nothing

in the Ortega case concerning total disability benefits.
This Court's action in attributing a finding to the Commission which the Commission did not make should properly void
the decision of the Court concerning contribution and apportionment from the special fund becuase the Commission has yet to
make a determination concerning permanent partial disability
which would allow apportionment under 35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
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The language of the Court in stating:
Consequently, inasmuch as it appears
that the pre-existing condition increased the
resulting disability by one third, it follows
that under the requirements of the statute,
the medical expenses as well as the compensation award should have been apportioned two
thirds from the employer and one third from
the special fund.
is again not proper because it is based on the false
premise that the Commission made a finding of 10 percent and
20 percent of permanent partial disability.
All other major points of the Court's decision are
clouded because they would not have rightly been before the
Court except for the false presumption that the Commission had
made a finding which they did not make.

Such points are the

question of "substantially greater" and the question of apportionment of medical expenses.

Both questions are dependant

upon there being a previous permanent incapacity which has not
yet been determined.
POINT II.
THIS COURT ERRED IN "APPARENTLY" DETERMINING
THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE A PREVIOUS
AND A PERMANENT INCAPACITY BEFORE APPORTIONMENT CAN BE MADE.
Because of the wrong assumption made by the Court in
Point I the questions involving apportionment were not properly
before the Court.

Before apportionment can be made under

35-1-69,supra there must be a finding of a previous and a
permanent incapacity.
The statute allowing apportionment, 35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953
reads:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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If any employee who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury,
disease or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury. . .that results in permanent
incapacity which is substantially greater than
he would have incurred if he had not had the
pre-existing incapacity...(emphasis added).
As outlined in Point I the Commission has not yet found
that there is a permanent incapacity, either pre-existing or
from the industrial accident.

And depending upon the results

of treatment there may well be no permanent incapacity.
POINT III.
THIS COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION OF
"SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER PERMANENT INCAPACITY."
Again, based on the false presumption that the Commission
had made a finding as to permanent incapacity, the Court stated
that it cannot be doubted that 30 percent is substantially
greater than 20 percent, nor that 10 percent disability is
itself substantial in that it is definite and measurable.

But

if there had been a determination as to percentage of disability
that existed before the accident that percentage figure would
have to be measurable before the accident.

If Mrs. Ortega had

been examined before the industrial accident the record is clear
that there would have been no disability found.

There cannot

be an apportionment value placed on a non-permanent, illusory
and non-definable possible ailment.

Before the industrial

accident there was only the possibility of a pre-disposition to
an incapacity.

If the reason for 35-1-69, supra,was to encourage

employers to hire the handicapped and to apportion expenses
among employers (see McPhie vs. U.S. Steel, 551 P.2d 504) it
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

w o u l d b e r-» H h .-. - ..

.

measurable handicap

that

'*rs.

Ort-ga

•

— u ; : ^. : . ( : f o r

existed
?

dici n u l t

before

• =, . t a

POIVV

!

the

--.

definite

a

and

industr'-*

incapacity

ac-d-^f.

;;o:orc.

-.ho

.

T h l ; J v>;uKT L:^r,iJ J.W ;\UT FOLLOWING PRECEDENT
OF COMMISSION ORDERS ON MEDICAL EXPENSES.
1

• *.

*»n^ p h i l o s o p h y
t-

fast

'• . ...my y* - * ' S / v c t o d

tha-

workman's

d e t ^ r i r p n' 5 t *

•?

«

. , • '.

the

special

.

vs

shouJ

.. . u l a r

i- a c t u a r i a l h.

•obstructed

guid--

*>•

co1. : s

^ae
-

framev. o r k

:
.:'

fund.

A
never

1

iiompens^ti^-'i

undo-' th-'-

.»•* • :

intended

-. . •

. . . .

and n a s n e v e r b e e n

(special

use i t o

apportion

fun'1)

was

medical

payments*
payments were
have

a case

that

plac^ a buiden

wodd

^^

•

ra-*-

: w

* v*<* Cnmrrirr

-K, : ) o f ^ ^

u

'• r v-<ju1d b*

apportioned

f.

g

s^siii LG *<• i. -

a a .jujL, 1 e
CONCLUSION
Ro'^
statement

'
Lnat

n o t make •• h
Cfise
the

.

. ip C o u ^ f

t h ^ Commi s s I o n h a d nad<-

d ^ c i s ; ^n

remanded

In

the

treatment,

of

Mrs,

n;

w a s b a s e d on
?

findin;

(

wjaLua

Commission
Ortega

wh-ic-

is

;.o>

necessary

finding,

fcilso
.
a ;icl

* -: d
the

who:.

completed.

Respectfullv

272^

submitted,

) / ~^'

FRANK V. NELSON

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
A s s i s t dr.! A t - f o r n e v
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<>

"~~

f-^^ri1

